EN 
SE 
A titanium flag planted on the bottom of the North Pole in 2007 is often described as the starting point of the modern race for the Arctic. Russia signaled its ambition, the world reacted, and since then the Swedish Defence Research Institute (FOI) has systematically monitored how the region is transforming.
On March 16, a comprehensive analysis was presented under the heading The Arctic – the new frontline in global security policy, organized by Finserve Global Security Fund and Solomos Communications.
In addition to Joakim Agreback, manager of Finserve Global Security Fund, three other experts also presented: Niklas Granholm, research leader from FOI with extensive experience in Arctic geopolitics, Stefan Gustafsson, space analyst with a focus on satellite infrastructure and surveillance systems, and Katarina Tracz, security policy analyst specializing in hybrid threats and critical infrastructure.
Climate change is locking in its own acceleration
The seminar began with a sober review of what climate data actually shows. Arctic ice minimums are reaching record lows with increasing frequency, and the multi-year ice, the blue-white ”cold block” that has remained year after year, is disappearing at a rapid pace.
The consequences extend beyond the Arctic. Multi-year ice acts as a global cooling element; as it disappears, the Earth’s air conditioning system deteriorates. At the same time, permafrost thaws, releasing methane, a greenhouse gas more than 20 times more powerful than carbon dioxide, in colossal quantities across Siberia, Alaska, and Canada. Infrastructure built for permafrost is collapsing: cities, airports, pipelines, and power lines throughout the subarctic belt risk hundreds of billions of dollars in damage.
Even if we stopped burning fossil fuels tomorrow, it would take decades for sea ice to stabilize again, centuries for permafrost, and millennia for ice sheets. We've already locked this in.
Niklas Granholm, FOI researcher
This means that the geopolitical opening of the Arctic is not a hypothetical future scenario. It is happening now, and every tenth of a degree of global temperature increase that can be avoided reduces the worst consequences but does not change the fundamental dynamics.
| Indicator | Status |
|---|---|
| Sea-level area of the Arctic Ocean | Only 25 % |
| Methane's climate impact vs. CO₂ | 20+ times more powerful |
| Estimated sea level rise by 2100 | Up to 1 meter |
| Arctic warming vs. global average | 3–4 times faster |
| Northeast Passage | Passable parts of the year already now |
Three great powers – three agendas
Niklas Granholm identified three dominant actors whose interests clash in the region. Russia is conducting military buildup along the entire Arctic coast and considers the Northeast Passage as national waters with requirements for Russian personnel on board transit vessels. The Kola Peninsula houses two-thirds of Russia's strategic nuclear weapons, which creates a cylinder of interest that directly affects northern Sweden, Finland and Norway. China has called itself a "Near-Arctic State" since 2018 and is actively seeking footholds in the region in Greenland, Iceland and Norway, paradoxically while the country advocates maximum coastal control in the South China Sea. The US's role as guarantor of the rules-based order is being questioned and the relationship with Canada and Denmark is burdened by territorial signals around Greenland.
The emerging dynamic creates space for medium-sized democracies to act together. The Oslo summit in March 2026, where Nordic prime ministers and Canada's Mark Carney met, is interpreted by analysts as a concrete expression of this: pragmatic cooperation outside the established multilateral framework, but complementary to NATO and the EU.
Greenland and the North American Arctic
Greenland's strategic importance goes deeper than the immediate discussion of territoriality suggests. The Tule base in northwestern Greenland houses one of the United States' most important ballistic missile early warning radar facilities. The Northwest Passage, from west of Greenland through the Canadian archipelago and north of Alaska to the Bering Strait, is another area of conflict. The United States and Canada disagree on whether it is internal Canadian waters or an international strait with the right of innocent passage. Under the Trump administration, diplomatic dialogue on the issue has ceased altogether.
NATO and the expanded area of operations
Sweden will join NATO Joint Forces Command Norfolk in December 2025, directly linking Swedish defense planning to the North Atlantic and the Arctic. This is a shift that requires a fundamentally different understanding of the Swedish area of operations than during the period of neutrality.
A central issue raised by the seminar participants was the so-called ”freeriding problem” in NATO. Countries geographically close to Russia, what FOI calls the ”axis of anxiety”, prioritize defense spending in a completely different way than countries in Western Europe. With a target of five percent of GDP in defense spending, the alliance risks being divided into an A and a B team.
Space as Arctic infrastructure
One of the most substantial parts of the seminar was about how satellite technology is redefining the Arctic strategic landscape. Three capabilities are critical and all three are lacking today.
Firstly, Earth observation: thousands of LEO satellites in polar orbit provide, in theory, near-real-time coverage of the entire region, but the data cannot yet be downloaded fast enough for real operational benefit.
Secondly, communications: geostationary satellites do not cover the Arctic with sufficient elevation, and new solutions combining LEO constellations with geostationary relay are under development.
Thirdly, space situational awareness: the ability to keep track of what is moving in orbit is a prerequisite for everything else, but not yet sufficiently developed.
The Swedish company OVZON was highlighted as a European pioneer in geostationary secure communications. The Swedish Armed Forces have awarded a contract to Esrange and the American Firefly to establish a European launch capability on European soil – a ”rapid response” capability to quickly replace satellites that are knocked out or damaged.
Sabotage and critical infrastructure
The sabotage of the submarine cable to Svalbard in January 2022, weeks before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, illustrates an often overlooked dimension: that Arctic infrastructure is directly linked to conflicts further south. The cable carried real-time data from the world’s largest commercial satellite fleet and enabled virtually continuous video surveillance of Russian troop buildups on the Ukrainian border. Russian ”fishing vessels” had passed over the cable’s route about a hundred times in connection with the breach. The pattern of hybrid operations against critical infrastructure as a prelude to open military conflict is a key lesson from the Arctic for the entire European security debate.
The Northern Passages – when will they open in earnest?
The issue of commercial shipping along the Northeast Passage is complex and intertwined with geopolitics. The route is already navigable during parts of the season and can reduce transit times by up to 40 percent compared to the Suez Canal. But Russia requires Russian pilots and sometimes Russian tonnage, making the route politically difficult for Western shipping companies. The Northwest Passage is even more problematic: poorer seaworthiness, harsher ice pressure conditions and political disagreement over its international legal status make it a long-term project.
It can range from a small number of transits to the door suddenly opening. The shipping companies study it behind closed doors. When the stars are right, they all start at once.
Niklas Granholm, FOI researcher, about the commercial potential of the Northeast Passage
The IMO Polar Code sets minimum requirements for sailing in Arctic waters and is a prerequisite for insurance. However, capacity gaps in terms of trained crews, ice-classed tonnage and rescue services are significant.
Sweden in the new Arctic
Northern Sweden is not a remote periphery, it is a geopolitical key zone. Esrange outside Kiruna is now the hub for European civil and military launch capabilities. Adjacent is the world's second largest iron ore mine and one of Europe's most significant deposits of rare earth metals. Svalbard, with its satellite fleet and submarine cables, is directly connected to global intelligence and communications infrastructure.
A new Swedish Arctic strategy is expected in May 2026, a year before Sweden takes over as chairman of the Arctic Council. The analysts emphasized that the strategy needs to address not only the civilian dimensions of infrastructure, energy, minerals and indigenous peoples, but also explicitly integrate the military strategic reality with the expanded NATO area of operations. The need for knowledge is great, and the understanding of how the Arctic functions as a system is still insufficient, not least internationally.